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Abstract—Information leakages are one of the main security
threats in today’s Internet. As ICN is expected to become the
core architecture for Future Internet, it is therefore mandatory
to prevent this threat. This paper proves that some ICN con-
figuration prevents information leakages via Data packets and
shows that it is an open problem to prevent interest packets from
carrying encoded crucial information in their names. Assuming
that names in ICN will follow the current URL format commonly
used in the Internet, we get the statistics of web URL based on
extensive crawling experiments of main internet organizations.
Then we propose a simple filtering technique based on these
statistics for firewall to detect anomalous names in ICN. The
experiment shows that our filtering technique recognizes 15% of
names in our dataset as malicious. As the false positive rate is
still high for this filter to be used in a real world operation, this
work is an important step for detecting anomalous names and
preventing information-leakage in ICN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-leakage is one of the main security threats
in today’s Internet [1]. Indeed, Cyber Espionage through
Targeted Attacks is viewed as the major attack for companies,
whatever their size and profit. Recently, IT companies such as
Sony or the retailer Target suffered from massive information
leakages. As a consequence, Target data breach in 2013 lets the
company spend more than $100 million upgrading the system
to prevent another breach and suffer from 46% drop in profits
after the attack itself [2]. These data breaches through Targeted
Attacks rely mostly on a malware installed via emails, websites
or external memory devices. They allow attackers to obtain
confidential information of companies.
As today’s Internet traffic is going to be composed mostly
of encrypted HTTPS traffic, it is therefore impossible for
a company to know precisely the data that is transported.
Network administrators have to rely on firewall and filtering
services to drop confidential information leaking packets while
a Targeted Attack consists of a malware to leak confidential
information out of the network as legitimate data not to be
dropped by security infrastructure of the company.
Information Centric Networking (ICN) relies on a new
networking paradigm based on content name. Indeed, today’s
users are interested in content and not its location as with
TCP/IP, and there is a need for a shift from host-to-host
communication paradigm to host-to-content paradigm. In this
context, Named-Data Networking (NDN) [3] has gained at-
tention and forms an increasing research community. It has
been implemented into NDNx architecture and relies on two
messages: (i) Interest, a request sent by a user toward a named
content, and (ii) Data, a response to a request sent by any nodes
possessing the named content. NDN content names are defined
in traditional URI as those existing in today’s Internet. The
network is responsible to cache content for further requests and
helps delivering the content to users wherever they are. NDN
messages exhibit the names of the contents to be exchanged
and the network administrator can explicitly control the traffic
through the firewall by their names.
This paper aims at investigating the information-leakage
security threat with names in ICN network. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the information
leakage security threat with names in ICN and provides a novel
technique to detect anomalous names. Our contributions are
fourfold: (1) For “Pull”-based ICN such as NDN, we prove
there exists a firewall configuration that prevents information
leakages through Data packets; (2) As the countermeasure of
the above firewall, we propose a model of Targeted Attack
using Interest packets, which encodes leaked information into
content names; (3) To block anomalous names created by these
attacks, we have to know the features of normal content names.
Assuming that the relevant statistics of NDN-like content
names can be predicted from those of the current URLs in the
Internet, we conduct a comprehensive study of web URL based
on extensive web crawling; (4) We propose a new filtering
technique to filter out anomalous NDN names, using these
statistics, such as length of path, etc.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II states the prob-
lem by presenting ICN architecture, ICN firewall, the Targeted
Attack in ICN network, and the naming policy through URL.
Section III presents our web crawling experiment on URL,
while Section IV presents statistical analysis on URL name
and our filtering techniques to detect anomalous name in NDN.
Section V surveys the related work and Section VI concludes
the paper and presents research perspectives.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section shows the overview of ICN, and explains
that a configuration of NDN firewall can prevent information
leakages through Data packets but it is possible for an attacker
to bypass the NDN firewall through Interest packet. Then,
we propose a model of Targeted Attack causing information
leakages in ICN network and discuss the future naming policy
in ICN.
A. Information Centric Networking
ICN basically adopts a “Pull”-based network architecture.
To retrieve information, at first a node sends an Interest packet
(i.e., a request) to the network and then obtains the Data packet
corresponding to the Interest packet, which is a reply packet
from the network. Along the delivery path, nodes can store
the transmitted information in order to serve further requests,
making the network able to provide information and reply
to Interest packet. In other words, nodes cannot send a Data
packet unless they receive an Interest packet, and they can get
a content from any nodes who has it such as the publisher and
network cache. The following discussions assume that ICN has
this property which is common in NDN.
In NDN, there are three components in the node; Forward-
ing Information Base (FIB), Pending Interest Table (PIT),
and Content Store (CS). FIB has the routing information to
forward the Interest packet. PIT maintains the return path state
to send the Data packet corresponding to the Interest packet.
CS is utilized to cache the Data packet based on the caching
replacement policy.
B. ICN Firewall and its Policy Maker
The basic framework of our firewall assumes the following
assumptions: A1) Operators have the naming policy and rout-
ing policy for all the information assets inside the enterprise
network, A2) Operators can announce to the outside network
what content name in the enterprise network can be accessed
from the outside network, but do not have any right for the
naming policies outside their network, A3) A malware has the
list of clients of this company.
It is easy to prevent the information leakages through
Data packets in NDN as follows: i) define the name prefix
for public contents as “/company/pub/” (A1), ii) announce
“/company/pub/” to the outside network (A2). In this case,
if the malware names the leaked list as ”/company/pub/ABC”,
then the Interest packet can reach the malware from the outside
network via the gateway. This can be blocked by the next rule.
iii) Any Interest packet from the outside network shall not be
relayed toward the inside network (A1).
Even though the malware sends a Data packet toward the
gateway, the gateway cannot send it toward the outside net-
work since there are no PIT entries for that Data packet. If the
malware announces the leaked list as “/company/pub/ABC”
inside the network, the gateway may cache this content during
the communications among the nodes inside the network. This
threat can be blocked by the next rule. iv) The gateway shall
not relay an Interest/Data packet whose name prefix is “/com-
pany/pub/” from the inside network back to the inside network
(A2). To realize the communications inside the network, the
nodes utilize the name prefix such as “/company/priv/” for the
private content, which cannot be accessed from outside.
In this case, all the publicly-accessible contents are on the
gateway. To control the content of its own, the following rule
is required. v) All the publicly-accessible content must be
listed in the white list (A1). These five rules can shut out
the information leakages through Data packets.
This is one of the main advantages of ICN or NDN com-
pared to HTTPS. The Internet architecture is based on host-to-
host communication paradigm, and so does content delivery.
NDN is a chance for each company to fully control their in-
formation assets. It is usual to declare the advantages of NDN
such that it provides the information integrity by signature, it
controls encryptions if required, and efficient content caching
is available using Attribute-based Encryption [4]. Table I
shows the comparison between IP firewall for HTTPS traffics
and ICN firewall since HTTPS traffics are becoming the major-
ity of Internet traffic. In the case of content distribution through
HTTPS, we can identify the location of the attacker as his host
IP address. It is, however, computationally difficult to identify
the attack since all the traffic are encrypted with SSL. Another
disadvantage of SSL is that it prevents content caching to
reduce the traffic. In contrast, content names are transparent at
forwarding an ICN/NDN packet and it is possible to develop
a various countermeasures against information leakages using
this advantage (e.g., “/company/pub/” and “/company/priv/”).
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN IP FIREWALL AND ICN FIREWALL
IP Firewall ICN Firewall
Identifying content sender Partially (host IP address) Yes (ID)
Identifying content receiver Partially (host IP address) No
Confirmation of content and its name No Yes
Cache availability No Yes
Information leakage through content name NA Partially
To remedy the disadvantage of HTTPS, D. Naylor et al.
propose mcTLS (Multi-Context TLS) extending TLS [5]. If
there is some consent between content provider and user, we
can adapt middle boxes for caching HTTPS traffics. However,
without the consent we cannot utilize middle boxes. Therefore,
it is difficult for middle boxes to obtain information from an
attacker, who does not agree to use them.
In ICN/NDN, however, gatekeepers do not hold the naming
policy right on contents outside their private network. This has
another risk of information leakages caused by encrypting the
internal content into the content names of Interest packets to
pretend to access the outside contents. Since no information
on the attacker is included in these Interest packets, it is more
difficult for the gatekeeper to detect the location of the attacker
than in the case of the current IP firewall. Thus, it is important
to develop the detection method of this attack.
C. Targeted Attack in ICN network
1) IP Network: Regarding the Targeted Attack in IP net-
work, first of all, an attacker targets a network such as an
enterprise network, and prepares emails, websites or external
memory devices with a malware and a Command and Control
server (C&C) [6]. C&C server is used by the attacker to
send commands to the malware and control the behavior of
the compromised computers. After the attacker has succeeded
infecting, these computers establish communication channels
to C&C server, which are called connect-back channels.
Through connect-back channels, the internal computers re-
quest connections to C&C server and allow the attacker to gain
access into the internal computers. Connect-back channels are
mainly used to bypass firewall security. Via these connect-back
channels, C&C server sends commands to infected computers
and control them remotely. Similarly, C&C server obtains
leaked data from infected computers.
Enterprise Network
Outside Network
Malware
C&C Server
Firewall
Bot
Interest Packet
(Answer to Command, 
Data such as Customer Information)
Data Packet
(Command)
Interest/Data Packet
Fig. 1. Targeted Attack causing information leakages in ICN.
2) ICN Network: Fig. 1 shows a Targeted Attack causing
information leakages in ICN. In advance, an attacker prepares
C&C server, bots whose name prefixes are registered into the
FIBs in the network, and a malware which knows the name
prefixes to establish the communication channels with bots.
Exploiting bots as springboards, C&C server does not need
to register his name prefix into FIBs, which allows him to
hide and protect himself. C&C server controls the malware
remotely via bots.
Thus the malware in the enterprise network can send Interest
packets to bots safely, by specifying bots’ name prefixes into
a part of content names for its first access. This Interest
packet is relayed to C&C server via a connect-back channel
after replacing the prefix into the one for C&C server. Then
via this connect-back channel, C&C server responds by the
corresponding Data packet with the appropriate commands
to control the malware at will. After the connection setup,
Interest packets are exploited to send the data such as customer
information to C&C server.
D. ICN Content Naming Policy as Natural Extension from
URL
In RFC 1808 [7], URL is defined as 〈scheme〉://〈net loc〉
/〈path〉;〈params〉?〈query〉#〈fragment〉. URL is created by a
host shown by 〈net loc〉 part. Each URL is unique in the
world when a user or an organization owing this host makes
this URL based on its own naming policy.
According to the report from Google [8], in 2008 there were
1 trillion unique URLs in the Internet. Users are accustomed
to the current URLs. Considering the high affinity between the
numerous contents named by URLs and users who are familiar
with their URLs, it is highly possible for the future ICN
content naming policy to become the one naturally evolved
from the current naming policy of URLs. Naming syntax of
CCNx 1.0 [9] as well as NDN [10] is similar to that of URL.
Thus we can predict the naming policy of these ICN systems
based on that of URL.
This future naming policy of CCNx or NDN may specify
ccn into 〈scheme〉 part. Thus, an organization or a user
described in 〈net loc〉 part can define a name from the 〈path〉
part to the 〈fragment〉 part, independent from each other.
This content naming policy is familiar with users and each
generated content name is unique in the world. Moreover, it
is very easy to translate the current numerous content names
distributed in the Internet to the corresponding ICN names.
In CCNx 1.0 and NDN, they refer to URI written in RFC
3986 [11] and lci and ndn are specified into 〈scheme〉
part respectively. Above two naming policies, however, ignore
〈authority〉 part, which corresponds to 〈net loc〉 part in RFC
1808. We consider that an authority described in 〈net loc〉 part
uniquely defines the name, even when the following parts of
〈path〉 may be defined independently. Therefore, this idea is
different from the naming policies of CCNx 1.0 and NDN.
However we assume the same discussions may be applied to
those naming policies except 〈authority〉. Fig. 2 shows the
content name naturally extending URL in this paper. However,
ccn, which is specified in 〈scheme〉 part, is omitted. 〈path〉
part has two parts; directory and file part. We omit 〈params〉
part because mainly this part is the option in FTP.
/(Organization)/(Directory 1)/…/(Directory n)/(File)?(Query)#(Fragment) 
<path><net_loc> <query> <fragment>
Directory Part File Part 
Fig. 2. Content name naturally extending URL [7].
III. EXPERIMENT
A. Web Crawling Experiment
In order to obtain statistics on name, we sampled the
URLs created by 7 main organizations of the Internet, namely
Amazon, Ask, Stack Overflow, BBC, CNN, Google, and
Yahoo, which were high ranked in the Alexa Top 500 Global
Sites [12]. To obtain the URL datasets, we utilized a breadth-
first crawler [13]. Our breadth-first crawler starts from the seed
URL of each organization (i.e., homepage) and goes across all
the encountered URLs in the page; we stop the process when
the crawler has reached 30,000 URLs. From these URLs, we
keep in our dataset those returning the HTTP status code 200
(OK) with the name of each organizaition in 〈net loc〉. Table II
shows the number of URLs in dataset for each organization.
B. Dataset Presentation and URL Attribute
After obtaining our dataset, we divided it into two distinct
sets: a training set and an evaluation set. The training set
contains 90% of the URLs, and it is used for the statistical
analysis of URL names (Section II-D). Moreover, from this
training set we computed the average frequencies of characters
in path, query, and fragment of the URLs in all the organaiz-
tions and defined them as average frequencies in path, query,
and fragment respectively. The evaluation set (remaining 10%
TABLE II
NUMBER OF URLS IN DATASET OF EACH ORGANIZATION
Organization Number of URLs
Amazon 10,020
Ask 6,388
Stack Overflow 19,133
BBC 8,936
CNN 2,749
Google 6,738
Yahoo 5,744
of the URLs) were used for evaluating our Interest packet
filtering as it will be presented in Section IV-B.
Table III shows 9 URL attributes. For some URLs, a file
name sometimes lacks in file part because some default pages
like index.html are often omitted. In such a case, we set the
length of file name to 0. For each path, query, and fragment,
we calculated the frequencies of characters in each URL and
compared them with the corresponding parts in the whole URL
datasets given by each organization using cosine similarity. We
referred them as CPath, CQuery, and CFragment.
TABLE III
9 ATTRIBUTES AND CORRESPONDING VARIABLES
Name Variable
Length of path LPath
Length of query LQuery
Length of fragment LFragment
Length of directory name LDirectoryName
Length of file name LFileName
Number of slashes in path NSlashes
Cosine similarity of frequencies of characters in path
CPathwith average frequencies in path
Cosine similarity of frequencies of characters in query
CQuerywith average frequencies in query
Cosine similarity of frequencies of characters in fragment
CFragmentwith average frequencies in fragment
IV. RESULT
A. Statistics on Name
Fig. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the length of path, query, fragment, direc-
tory name, file name, and the number of slashes, respectively,
for each organization. Averaged CDF (i.e., overall in legend)
has been normalized considering the differences between the
number of URLs from each organization. Table IV shows the
percentiles of each variable obtained from averaged CDF.
TABLE IV
PERCENTILES OF EACH VARIABLE
Variable 90% 95% 99%
LPath 79 100 122
LQuery 127 162 283
LFragment 16 23 54
LDirectoryName 15 21 41
LFileName 46 57 90
NSlashes 5 5 7
Table V shows CPath, CQuery , and CFragment. Basically,
the more closed to 1 the cosine similarity gets, the more similar
TABLE V
AVERAGE COSINE SIMILARITY OF FREQUENCIES OF CHARACTERS IN
EACH URL TO CHARACTER FREQUENCIES IN PATH, QUERY, AND
FRAGMENT PARTS AVERAGED OVER THE WHOLE DATASET IN EACH
ORGANIZATION
Organization Average CPath Average CQuery Average CFragment
Amazon 0.76 0.73 0.5
Ask 0.76 0.86 0.57
Stack Overflow 0.77 0.76 0.4
BBC 0.74 0.56 0.6
CNN 0.81 0.54 0.63
Google 0.66 0.67 0.62
Yahoo 0.72 0.64 0.51
Average 0.75 0.68 0.55
those two vectors are. Average values of CPath, CQuery, and
CFragment for the 7 organizations are 0.75, 0.68 and 0.55,
respectively.
In addition, we created another dataset with all the URLs in
each organization, where we removed the first ‘?’ identifying
the start of query and also ‘#’ identifying the start of frag-
ment. Then, we calculated the cosine similarity of frequencies
of alphabets in each dataset with typical English text. As
for the frequencies of alphabets in typical English text, we
use those defined in Ref. [14] (english-letter-frequency.dat).
The highest cosine similarity of path was 0.98. This means
that it is highly possible for the English words to be used
in path. We confirmed that in actual URL datasets their
readability was high (e.g., http://edition.cnn.com/specials/asia/
on-the-road-japan). However, in the case of Stack Overflow,
the cosine similarity was 0.51, and this value was the lowest
because the word “tab-top” was often used in fragment.
B. Evaluation of Interest Packet Filtering
Assuming the naming policy of NDN is similar to that of
URL, in this section, we propose a countermeasure against Tar-
geted Attack with Interest packets, based on name anomaly. In
this filter, we assume the normal name from our URL dataset
belongs to the 95th percentile of each variable. Thus, based
on the statistics from Section IV-A about LPath, LQuery ,
LFragment, LDirectoryName, LFileName, and NSlashes, we
defined a filter (F1) as formula (1) referring to Table IV, where
each variable is larger than the 95th percentile.
F1 = (LPath ≥ 101) ∨ (LQuery ≥ 163) ∨ (LFragment ≥ 24)
∨ ( min
in path
LDirectoryName ≥ 22) ∨ (LFileName ≥ 58)
∨ (NSlashes ≥ 6)
(1)
When an URL is filtered with F1 and the resultant F1
becomes true, this URL has an anomalous name and may
cause information leakages. Thus Interest packet with this
anomalous name has to be droped. We used our filter F1 on
the evaluation dataset (10% of the remaining URLs), described
in Section III-B. The false positive rate or the ratio of filtered
names as anomalous in the datasets was 33%.
From the point of cosine similarity, we define another filter
(F2) as formula (2) referring to Table V.
F2 = (CPath < 0.75) ∨ (CQuery < 0.68)
∨ (CFragment < 0.55)
(2)
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Fig. 3. The length of path.
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Fig. 4. The length of query.
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Fig. 5. The length of fragment.
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The false positive rate was 52%.
F1 is mainly based on the length to detect anomalous
names. The longer name increases the possibility that F1 is
true. But, if the name is not anomalous, the longer it is, and the
better similarity it has since it has more characters to compare.
Thus we define the third filter as shown in formula (3).
F3 = F1 ∧ F2 (3)
In this case, the false positive rate was 15%. It means that 15%
of names are considered as anomalous to be dropped. But the
false positive rate was still high. To solve this problem, we
must further investigate better measures with a smaller false
positive rate as well as the false negative rate.
C. Discussion
The proposed filters are based on statistics from our URL
crawling experiments. Basically, filters can help stating if the
name of an Interest packet is legitimate or anomalous. Indeed,
in case of Targeted Attacks in an ICN network, if the names
created by a malware are detected as anomalous, packets will
be dropped and the attack will be prevented. As 15% of name
anomaly detection is significant, it is still possible to improve
the accuracy of the filters.
Note that a malware can also learn the statistics rules used
by our filters (length of path, length of fragment, etc). In fact,
to overcome this limitation, each network operators should
monitor names in their network and should adapt lively the
threshold of the filters. This also requires traffic anomaly
detection techniques, where network operators monitor con-
tinuously the traffic to detect slight changes and set up alarm
if detected.
Even in ICN world, SEO (Search Engine Optimization)
business will exist. SEO is an optimization to improve the
rank of the web site in search engines such as Google and to
move this web site in the upper level of retrieval results by
search engines. One of the methods to improve the rank is to
modify the structure of URL according to the recommended
policies. Moz, which is one of the SEO companies, reports
the policies to modify the structure of URL [15]. Specifically,
these policies are “to become human-readable”, “to add the
keywords”, “to shorten the length”, “to decrease the number
of directories”, “to avoid utilizing the hash value”, “to utilize
“-” or “ ” to separate words”, “to avoid utilizing the keywords
repeatedly”, and so on. Likewise, in ICN/NDN the names will
also follow some policies in terms of SEO, and they will
narrow the degree of freedom to make names. Then, we can
utilize these limitations in filtering.
V. RELATED WORK
There are a few research activities about ICN Firewall.
D. Goergen et al. [16] focus on filtering Data packets in ICN
Firewall, and propose 7 filters. They mainly focus on the situa-
tions to pull the contents outside/inside the enterprise network.
Basically, there are three approaches for countermeasure; entry
control, inside operation prevention, and exit control [6]. Entry
control prevents attacks from getting into the system. Inside
operation prevention enhances monitoring and prevents deeper
infiltration into the internal system. Exit control enhances mon-
itoring and blocks the suspicious outbound communications.
In this paper, we focus on exit control and propose Interest
packet filtering.
One of the other examples than NDN in ICN is DONA
(Data-Oriented Network Architecture) [17]. In contrast to
NDN, the name in DONA has a flat structure. Specifically,
the name is constructed by the pair of P and L (P:L). P is
the hash value of publisher’s public key and L is a unique
label assigned by publisher. This name, which includes the
hash value of public key, is called Self-Certifying Names.
A. Ghodsi et al. [18] discuss a human-readable name and
Self-Certifying Names in terms of the relationship between
Real-World Identity (RWI), name, and public key. RWI refers
to a person or organization. Considering three parts; security,
scalability, and flexibility, they argue the efficacy of Self-
Certifying Names. Moreover, as one method not to use public
key needed for data authentication, M. Baugher et al. [19]
propose Self-Verifying Names, which utilize a hash value in
names got from Catalog.
According to these naming policies, there are three
kinds of content names; human-readable name, non-human-
readable name, and the combination of human-readable and
non-human-readable name. However, considering informa-
tion leakages through Interest packets, which we mention
in Section II-C, we cannot distinguish whether encrypted
non-human-readable name is the real content name or the
name created by a malware. When Self-Verifying Names are
exploited to realize information leakages, the volume of the
leaked data is low because in the names the length of hash
value is limited. The name in DONA has also limitation about
the length of the hash value. According to the packet format in
Ref. [17], the length of P:L is 40 Byte. However, the name in
NDN has variable length. Therefore, an attacker can increase
the volume of the leaked data easily. NDN has a higher risk
about information leakages through the names.
VI. CONCLUSION
Information leakages through Interest packets will be one of
the main security threats in ICN. It is therefore mandatory to
propose countermeasures. In this context, we design Interest
packet filtering to detect anomalous names in ICN and prevent
information leakage. Indeed, malicious names are more likely
to be created by malwares to leak information of the network
through Targeted Attack. Our name anomaly detection filters
are based on statistics from URLs that we obtained through
extensive crawling experiments of main Internet organizations.
Our filter is currently immature and recognizes 15% of names
in our dataset as malicious since they are not compliant
with the statistical properties of the collected URLs. This
false positive rate is still too high to use this filter in a real
field of operation. However, this work is an important step
for detecting anomalous names and preventing information-
leakage in ICN.
The actual performance of our filter must be evaluated
against real attacks which encode leaked information into their
interest names. Invention of such methods is one of our future
works. We will take into account SEO rules followed by most
of the top websites to improve the accuracy of our filters.
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